DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE UNDER COMPETITION LAW

AUTHOR – ASHIMA GUPTA* & DR. SUSANTA KUMAR SADANGI**

* STUDENT AT ICFAI UNIVERSITY, DEHRADUN

** PROFESSOR AT ICFAI UNIVERSITY, DEHRADUN

BEST CITATION – ASHIMA GUPTA & DR. SUSANTA KUMAR SADANGI, DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE UNDER COMPETITION LAW, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (6) OF 2026, PG. 28-43, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

ABSTRACT

The exponential rise of digital platforms over the past two decades has irrevocably altered the architecture of modern markets. Unlike conventional businesses operating within linear supply chains, digital platforms function as multi-sided intermediaries governed by strong network effects, data-intensive business models, and algorithmic decision-making. These structural features rarely present in traditional industries allow a handful of firms to entrench significant market power with remarkable speed. While competition law has long accepted that dominance per se is not unlawful, the abuse of that dominance in platform ecosystems raises complex and novel legal questions, particularly where services are rendered without monetary charge and user data constitutes the primary competitive resource.

This paper examines how the doctrine of abuse of dominance is being tested and reshaped by platform-centric business models. It identifies key markers of digital dominance including data control, gatekeeping power, switching costs, and vertical integration and analyses the principal forms of abusive conduct encountered in online markets: predatory pricing, self-referencing, tying and bundling, exclusionary contracting, and exploitative data practices. Drawing on enforcement experiences across India, the European Union, and other major jurisdictions, the paper assesses how regulatory bodies are adapting existing legal frameworks to address emerging anti-competitive behavior.

The paper further engages with the practical difficulties that confront competition authorities, including market definition in zero-price settings, assessment of non-price harm, and the tension between preserving innovation incentives and ensuring effective enforcement across borders. Against the backdrop of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and India’s proposed Digital Competition Bill, the paper argues for a forward-looking regulatory strategy that combines responsive ex-post enforcement with carefully calibrated ex-ante obligations for dominant digital gatekeepers.

The central argument of this study is that safeguarding competitive digital markets requires a fundamental reassessment of competition law tools one that takes seriously data concentration, algorithmic transparency, and platform ecosystem dynamics. Only a sophisticated, adaptive legal framework can simultaneously protect innovation, prevent anti-competitive foreclosure, and uphold consumer welfare in an increasingly digitized world.

KEYWORDS: Digital platforms, Abuse of dominance, Competition law, Network effects, Data monopoly, Market power.