THE INEFFECTIVE PROCESS OF REMOVING INDIAN JUDGES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

AUTHOR – DHINAGAR. P* & Ms. EZHILARASI M**

* STUDENT AT SCHOOL OF LAW, VELS INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ADVANCED STUDIES (VISTAS)

** ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT SCHOOL OF LAW, VELS INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ADVANCED STUDIES (VISTAS)

BEST CITATION – DHINAGAR. P & Ms. EZHILARASI M, THE INEFFECTIVE PROCESS OF REMOVING INDIAN JUDGES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (6) OF 2026, PG. 478-485, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.

Abstract

India’s constitutional framework for judicial removal—impeachment under Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) of the Constitution of India 1950—has never resulted in the removal of single jude in over seventy-five years of independent India. This paper critically analyses the systemic defects that have rendered this mechanism wholly inoperative. Drawing primarily on an examination of the structural issues and challenges identified through doctrinal analysis and a review of all significant impeachment attempts—Justice V Ramaswami (1993), Justice P D Dinakaran (2010), Justice Soumitra Sen (2011), Justice S K Gangele (2015), Justice C V Nagarjuna Reddy (2017), and Justice Yashwant Varma (2025–2026)—the paper argues that failure is the product of compounding constitutional, legislative, definitional, political, and institutional defects. The paper further draws on comparative models from the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia to propose targeted reforms, including the creation of an independent National Judicial Accountability Commission, a statutory definition of “proved misbehaviour,” a preliminary screening mechanism, and a legislative response to the resignation loophole.

Keywords: judicial accountability, impeachment, proved misbehaviour, Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968, judicial independence, judges removal, constitutional reform