BREAKING THE CARTEL SILENCE: A STUDY OF LENIENCY MECHANISMS IN THE INDIAN COMPETITION LANDSCAPE

AUTHOR – SHARANYA AGARWAL* & MR. PRAFUL SARAN**

* STUDENT AT AMITY UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW CAMPUS

** ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT AMITY UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW CAMPUS

BEST CITATION – SHARANYA AGARWAL & MR. PRAFUL SARAN, BREAKING THE CARTEL SILENCE: A STUDY OF LENIENCY MECHANISMS IN THE INDIAN COMPETITION LANDSCAPE, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (2) OF 2026, PG. 785-798, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/JZQW2726

Abstract

Identifying and prosecuting cartels, which is often called the supreme evil of antitrust, is still among the most difficult issues of competition authorities around the world. The cartels are very dangerous to consumer welfare, they suppress innovation, and they pervert market efficiency due to the secretive nature and the coordinated anti-competitiveness behavior of such cartels. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has increasingly been using its leniency program, which has been based on Section 46 of the Competition Act, 2002, to unravel these illegitimate arrangements in the Indian context. This is a research paper that offers a detailed analysis of the development and the success of the leniency mechanisms in the Indian competition arena. It follows the path of the development of the Lesser Penalty Regulations of 2009 to the ground-breaking amendments of 2017 and the introduction of the so-called ‘Leniency Plus’ regime by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. The paper estimates the practical difficulties that limit a vigorous race to the CCI by examining some of the trends and legal precedents in enforcement, such as the initial case of Brushless DC Fans and the broad Battery Cartel decisions. These obstacles comprise procedural ambiguity, the elevated evidentiary bar to vital disclosure, the threat of follow-on damages, and the threat of public procurement debarment. Additionally, the paper looks at the mechanism of Leniency Plus in detail, the mechanism that is capable of incentivizing self-reporting in various markets of the product, and conforms to the international best practice in the US and EU. The study employs a descriptive and analytical approach, which uses the provisions of the statutes, regulatory guidelines, and critical analysis by scholars. The results imply that the Indian leniency regime has grown considerably, but the bottom line to its success is the improvement of transparency in the procedures, the high level of confidentiality protection, and a balance between the carrot and the stick of penalties reduction and effective deterrence. The paper ends with a series of policy recommendations to tighten the leniency framework in order to have a more competitive and transparent market environment in India.

Keywords: Cartels, Leniency Mechanism, Competition Commission of India, Leniency Plus, Section 46, Competition Act 2002, Anti-competitive Agreements, Market System, Bid-rigging.