FISCAL FEDERALISM AND CENTRALIZING DRIFT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA’S GST COUNCIL AND SOUTH AFRICA’S EQUITABLE SHARE SYSTEM

AUTHORS- NIGHAT FATIMA* & DR AXITA SRIVASTAVA**

* LL.M (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW), AMITY LAW SCHOOL, AMITY UNIVERSITY UTTAR PRADESH LUCKNOW CAMPUS

** ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, AMITY LAW SCHOOL, AMITY UNIVERSITY UTTAR PRADESH LUCKNOW CAMPUS

BEST CITATION – NIGHAT FATIMA & DR AXITA SRIVASTAVA, FISCAL FEDERALISM AND CENTRALIZING DRIFT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA’S GST COUNCIL AND SOUTH AFRICA’S EQUITABLE SHARE SYSTEM, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 827-835, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344. DOI – https://doi.org/10.65393/MSEQ6976

ABSTRACT

This research paper provides an exhaustive comparative analysis of the phenomenon of ‘centralizing drift’ within the fiscal federalism frameworks of India and South Africa. Despite divergent constitutional categorizations India as a ‘Union of States’ with a federal superstructure and South Africa as a unitary state with distinctive ‘spheres’ of government both nations exhibit a pronounced trajectory toward fiscal centralization. This study interrogates the institutional mechanisms facilitating this drift: India’s Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council and South Africa’s Equitable Share system. Through a doctrinal and socio-legal analysis of primary constitutional texts, including the Constitution of India 1950 and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, alongside pivotal judicial pronouncements such as Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd^[1] and Uthukela District Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa,^[2] the report demonstrates how ‘cooperative federalism’ is frequently deployed as a rhetorical device to obscure structural coercion. The analysis reveals that while India’s centralization is constitutionally codified through the 101st Amendment and the voting asymmetry of the GST Council, South Africa’s centralization is functionally entrenched through extreme vertical fiscal imbalances and the subordination of provincial autonomy to the National Treasury. The paper concludes that the preservation of subnational autonomy in both jurisdictions requires a paradigmatic shift from purely ‘cooperative’ models to frameworks that institutionalize ‘uncooperative’ contestation and robust fiscal capacity at the periphery.

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[1] Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd (2022) SCC OnLine SC 657.

[2] Uthukela District Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 678 (CC).