JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND INDEPENDENCE IN INDIA: REVISITING THE COLLEGIUM DEBATE ON EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE
AUTHOR – ASHISH CHANDRA DEWANSHU, STUDENT AT AMITY UNIVERSITY NOIDA
BEST CITATION – ASHISH CHANDRA DEWANSHU, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND INDEPENDENCE IN INDIA: REVISITING THE COLLEGIUM DEBATE ON EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW (IJLR), 6 (6) OF 2026, PG. 83-89, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344.
Abstract
The question of judicial appointments in India has generated constitutional debates regarding judicial independence and separation of powers. This essay highlights the development of the appointment process in India with particular emphasis on the collegium system of appointments evolved judicially by the Supreme Court of India.[1]
The analysis of significant judicial pronouncements such as the judgment in cases of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India and Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India has shown that they have contributed greatly in shaping the present-day system of appointments. In fact, the former case has placed judicial primacy in appointments while the latter one has upheld it by declaring the validity of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 as unconstitutional.
Despite the intended purpose of making the process free from executive control, the collegium process has been criticized owing to its opaque nature, accountability issues, and lack of criteria in the decision-making process.
This paper reexamines the issue of the role of the executive in the judicial appointments process to find out if there is any scope of creating a balanced and constitutionally sound procedure which respects the principle of judicial independence without sacrificing transparency and accountability.
This research paper, however, concludes that what is needed at this stage is a pragmatic approach to reforming the system through introducing certain changes in the current process, such as adding a procedural element of transparency and using objective standards and limited institutional oversight. These changes will contribute to improving both the judicial independence and public confidence in the process of appointing judges.
Keywords: Judicial Appointments; Judicial Independence; Collegium; Supreme Court of India; Separation of Powers; Executive Interference; Constitutional Principles; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India; National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014; Transparency; Accountability; Judicial Review; Constitutional Governance; India
[1] INDIA CONST. arts. 124, 217.