LENIENCY POLICY: A COLLUDERS BAIT IN LIGHT OF INDIAN COMPETITION LAW
Abstract
LENIENCY POLICY: A COLLUDERS BAIT IN LIGHT OF INDIAN COMPETITION LAW
Authors - SUKRITI MATHUR & MAYANK RAJ MAURYA, Students of LLOYD LAW COLLEGE
Cartels are reckoned to be the most potent form of antitrust offences in competition law. In order to eliminate the cartel, conduct remains the highest precursory for all the competition law agencies globally. Although, detecting, identifying and prosecuting cartels is an uphill battle for the antitrust enforcement agencies. To make it convenient or to aid enforcement, authorities adopted the leniency programmes to embolden the cartel participants to identify their co-conspirators to antitrust regulators and in return for providing the evidence of operation of cartels, leniency programmes allow antitrust enforcement agencies to grant a reward of lesser penalties or full immunity as compare to the other member in the cartel. It is considered as one of the most effective tools for the detection of cartels.
MAKING LENIENCY APPEALING TO WHISTLEBLOWERS
Leniency policy acts as a cushion for the collaborating business that exposes the existence of a cartel and provides proof during the prosecution stage. The new amendment bill gives a new impetus to the leniency trend. The revised leniency rules seem to be more lenient in terms of punishments and the possibility of awarding forgiveness when the company gets on board during the inquiry.
Wide assortment of inducements is presented to these whistleblowers in order to entice them to participate in this leniency plus policy. Individual leniency policy, which gives safeguards to individuals regardless of their enterprises, is among the most prominent advantages. Immunity is another incentive for first-time informers of antitrust misconduct. The blend of severe penalties and promised immunity for the first informant creates a powerful impetus.
The excess of profit granted is also considered while offering more incentives. Other methods for encouraging responsiveness to the leniency Plus policy include a significant rise in the penalties for cartel participation and guaranteed protection against penalty for the first informer. The authorities also employ lower intelligence gathering rules as an incentive to increase public trust in the leniency allocation mechanism.
Under certain circumstances, public antitrust proceedings are backed by private lawsuits for damages, making informers responsible to pay damages in the private case, undermining the motivation. To eliminate this problem, the corporation devised the concept of secrecy, which led to the admission of spoken organizational declarations and retaining them guarded in perpetuity, and so the ripple impact of the antitrust litigation was managed by adopting this strategy.
LENINCY PROVISIONS UNDER THE COMPETITION LAW ACT
Section 46 of the Competition Law Act empowers the commission to grant lesser penalty on a member of the cartel who provides the vital information regarding the cartel and this section also potent the commission to impose the penalties in respect of the violation of section 3, along with the cooperating in future investigation which were carried out by the Director – General. In the context of leniency programs, Section 64 of the Act empowers the commission to make regulation to exercise this power and with the assistance of these regulations commission can give the lesser penalties that it is mentioned in the statue. Section 57 of the Act empowers that the information obtained by the Appellate Tribunal or Commission shall be confidential and further such disclosure shall be made after prior imprimatur of the enterprise. Lesser penalties are subjected to certain conditions and they can retract or occlude by the CCI if it is evident that the conditions are not fulfilled.
A new mechanism in competition law will be introduced through the Competition Law Amendment Bill 2022 i.e., Leniency plus regime. This will strengthen the leniency regime relating to the multiple cartels, enabling an applicant for leniency in one cartel evince the existence of another cartel and obtain full waiver or reduction in penalty in both the existing and the revealed cartels.
CASES RELATED TO LENIENCY REGIME
The Paper manufacture cartel case commenced with a referral from the DG to CCI, which enveloped 20 businesses that engaged in predatory pricing. During the progress of the inquiry, Trident Limited was identified as a colluding industry, while certain businesses were subsequently cleared since they did not participate in anti-trust occurrences.
Later, CCI sided with the DG's findings, deeming the Undertaker to be in violation of section 3(3)(a) of the Competition Act, resulting in the establishment of a hub and spoke collusion. A cumulative penalty of INR 500,000 was levied; however, Trident was granted amnesty and had the fine reduced by 100%.
The subsequent use of leniency laws was shown in the case of cartel in supply of composed bake bricks to Indian railway case, which was based purely on a referral to CCI by railway personnel.
During the DG's enquiry, a few players submitted a leniency request, and it was discovered that only two businesses out of all the major corporations were in violation of Section 3, resulting in no monetary penalties due to the small profitability ratio of the industry, the 2019 pandemic, and the organization's cooperation during the investigation period.
CONCLUSION
The leniency program initiated by the competition commission is part of the carrot and stick approach which the commission pursues to achieve its long-term goals, as envisioned in their mission . It's a kind of a whistleblower protection program to motivate the insider to come out and help the authorities without fear of excessive penalties and unwarranted harassment.
The success of the leniency program depends directly on the confidence which the bill can generate among the potential whistleblower in the cost benefit analysis which the party is bound to perform. The stricter the investigating arm and the harsher the punishment to the offenders, the easier it would be to motivate the defaulters to come out and confess.
The bill may try to appeal to the conscience of the offender but a mere passive Gandhian "Satya - – Aagraha" may fall short to invoke a sense of righteousness in the hardened profit hungry professionals. Through the bill, the law apparatus should present an impartial, justified and empathetic image to the business community so that all the stakeholders presume it as growth oriented rather than coercive.
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