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ILE-AIT-744 Indian Journal of Legal Review (IJLR)
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<strong>FRAUD – An Legal Analyse</strong>

Author(s): ILE Legal Blog
Volume: 4 Issue: 2 Year: 2023 ISSN: 2583-2344 APIS: 3920-0001 Publisher: Institute of Legal Education (ILE)
Recommended Bluebook Citation
ILE Legal Blog, <strong>FRAUD – An Legal Analyse</strong>, 4 Indian Journal of Legal Review 2 (2023).

Abstract

FRAUD – An Legal Analyse

Author - Irene Maria Shajan, Student at Government Law College, Coimbatore

Abstract

             My article contains an introduction which is related to an explanation on fraud. An illustration of fraud is mentioned. The laws which deals with the fraud is also given. Tye famous case laws like  Sankaran Govindan vs Lakshmi Bharathi & Other  and Rajib Panda vs Lakhan Sendh Mahapatra And Ors. Are also discussed. The conclusion is given in the end and finally comes the bibliography.

Introduction

         Fraud is nothing but an act of deceiving another person. The deceiving is done with the intention of cheating a person. It is an offence under the Indian Penal Code and also under The Indian Contract Act. It is a very common form of offense which is seen every where . It amounts to different kinds of punishment under the code. But in history we can see that it can revived with different kinds f punishment for different number of people.

Illustration

           A sells by auction to B a horse, which A knows to be unsound, A says nothing to B about the horse’s unsoundness. This is not fraud in A.

Laws Which Deals With Fraud

Section 17. Of Indian Contract Act

   “Fraud” defined.

“Fraud” means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent1 , with intent to deceive another party thereto of his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:—

(1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;

(2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;

(3) a promise made without any intention of performing it;

(4) any other act fitted to deceive;

(5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.

Explanation.—Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak2 , or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.

Illustrations

(a) A sells, by auction, to B, a horse which A knows to be unsound. A says nothing to B about the horses unsoundness. This is not fraud in A.

(b) B is As daughter and has just come of age. Here, the relation between the parties would make it As duty to tell B if the horse is unsound.

© B says to A—“If you do not deny it, I shall assume that the horse is sound.” A says nothing. Here, As silence is equivalent to speech.

(d) A and B, being traders, enter upon a contract. A has private information of a change in prices which would affect Bs willingness to proceed with the contract. A is not bound to inform B.

Section421.of Indian Penal Code

 Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent distribution among creditors.—Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently removes, conceals or delivers to any person, or transfer or causes to be transferred to any person, without adequate consideration, any property, intending thereby to pre­vent, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby prevent, the distribution of that property according to law among his creditors or the creditors of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE Punishment—Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both—Non-cogniz­able—Bailable—Triable by any Magistrate—Compoundable by the credi­tor who are affected thereby with the permission of the court.

Section 422. of Indian Penal Code

Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing debt being available for creditors.—Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently prevents any debt or demand due to himself or to any other person from being made available according to law for payment of his debts or the debts of such other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Section 423. of Indian Penal Code

Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed of transfer con­taining false statement of consideration.—Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently signs, executes or becomes a party to any deed or instrument which purports to transfer or subject to any charge any property, or any interest therein, and which contains any false statement relating to the consideration for such transfer or charge, or relating to the person or persons for whose use or benefit it is really intended to operate, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Section 424.of Indian Penal Code

Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property.—Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently conceals or removes any property of himself or any other person, or dishonestly or fraud­ulently assists in the concealment or removal thereof, or dishon­estly releases any demand or claim to which he is entitled, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Case Laws

  1. Sankaran Govindan vs Lakshmi Bharathi & Others on 15 April, 1974[1]

               By action or operate as res judicata. The leading case on the subject in England is Abouloff v. Oppenheimer(1). This was an action brought on a Russian judgment which ordered the return of certain goods unlawfully detained by the defendant, or alternatively, the payment of their value. One defence was that the judgment had been obtained by fraud in that the plaintiff had falsely represented to the Russian Court that the defendant was in possession of the goods the truth being that the plaintiff himself continued in possession of them throughout. It was demurred that this was an insufficient answer in point of law, since the plea was one which the Russian Court could, as a matter of fact did, consider, and that to examine it again would mean a new trial on merits. Lord Coleridge, C.J. said that English Court will have to decide whether the foreign court has been misled by the fraud of the, plaintiff as the. Question whether it was misled. Could never have been submitted to it, and never could have been in issue between the parties and never could have been decided by it and, therefore, the English Court was not retrying any issue which was or could have been submitted to the determination of the Russian Court. The learned Chief Justice also said that “the fraud of the person who has obtained the foreign judgment,’ is none the less capable of being pleaded and proved as an answer to an action on the foreign judgment in a proceeding in this country, because the facts. Necessary to be proved in the English Courts were suppressed in the foreign court by the fraud on the part of the person who seeks to enforce the judgment which the foreign court was by that person misled so as to pronounce.

               Where a fraud has been successfully perpetrated for the purpose of obtaining the judgment of a Court, it seems to me fallacious to say, that because the foreign court believes what at the moment it has no means of knowing to be false, the court is mistaken and not misled; it is plain that if it had been proved before the foreign court that fraud had been perpetrated with the view of obtaining its decision. The judgment would have been different from what it was”.Matters which have to be borne in mind, and the joint operation of which gives rise to the, difficulty. First of all, there is the general rule that a party to an action can impeach the judgment for fraud and second, there is the general proposition which is perfectly well settled, that when an action is brought a foreign judgment, a court cannot go into the merits which have been tried in the foreign court and that one has to combine these two rules and apply them in the case. He then said :So far as the American decisions are concerned, while it is clean that a foreign judgment may be attacked on the ground of fraud in its procurement, it is not clear how far this doctrine goes. Abouloff v. Oppenheimer (supra) and Vadala v. Lawes (supra) were referred to by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hilton v. Guvot (1) where Gray J. said : “Whether those decisions can be followed in regard to foreign judgments, consistently with our own decision as to impeaching domestic judgments for fraud, it is unnecessary in this case to determine”. The matter is open, though Goodrich points out that there is no American case, in which the plea of fraud has permitted reexamination of the very matters determined in the original Suit(2). According to Cheshire, the effect of the judgments in Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, Vadala v. Lawes and Syal v. Hevward (supra) is that the doctrine as to the conclusiveness of foreign judgments is materially and most illogically prejudiced(1).“The fraud which vitiates a judgment must generally be fraud of the party in whose favour the judgment is obtained”(1).

                       It was the administrators who obtained ex. 56 order and by no stretch of imagination could it be said that they practiced any fraud by adducing evidence which they. Knew was false or induced any person or witness to give false evidence or file any false affidavit. Nor could it be said that the English Court was misled by what the first defendant said about the domicile of Krishnan, as persons who were more competent to speak about the domicile of Krishnan had filed affidavits and tendered oral evidence to the effect that Krishnan died domiciled in England. If that be so, the further question is whether the proceedings in which ex. 56 order was obtained were opposed to natural justice. It was contended that notices of the proceeding which culminated in ex. 56 order have been served on the minors through their natural guardians, that natural guardians were not appointed as guardians ad litem and therefore, the proceedings were opposed to principles of natural justice. In other words, the argument was, that, since the natural guardians on whom the notices of the proceedings were served were not appointed as guardians ad litem of the minors, they had no opportunity to contest the proceedings on behalf of the minors and so the proceedings were opposed to natural justice.

  • Rajib Panda vs Lakhan Sendh Mahapatra And Ors. On 18 July, 1899[2]

                  After carefully considering the arguments on both sides, I think the contention of the defendant ought to prevail. The question before us is one of the construction of Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act. The proper mode of dealing with such a question is that indicated in the following observations of Lord Herschell in the Bank of England v. Vagliano (1891) L.R., App. Cas., 107, which were adopted by the Privy Council in Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasmi Dasi (1896) I.L.R., 23 Cal. 563: “I think,” said his Lordship, “the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the Statute and to ask what is its natural meaning uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law, and not start with enquiring how the law previously stood, and then assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view.” Examining then the language of Section 44 of the Evidence Act which runs in these words: “Any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree, which is relevant under Sections 40, 41 or 42, and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion,” I find that it provides that a party to a suit or other proceeding may show that a judgment, order or decree which is relevant, under Section 40, that is, which would as a judgment inter parties, operate as res judicata, or which is relevant under Section 41, that is, which is evidence as a judgment in rem, or which is relevant under Section 42, that is, which is evidence as a judgment relating to a public matter, and which is proved by the adverse party, was passed by a Court which had no jurisdiction to pass it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. Or in other words (confining our attention to so much of the section as bears upon the present case) a party to a suit may show that a judgment or decree, which is conclusive as a judgment or decree inter partes and which has been proved, against him by his adversary in that suit, was obtained by fraud. And when may the party show that the judgment or decree was obtained by fraud? The context evidently shows that the answer must be “In the suit in which the judgment is proved against him by his adversary.” The language of the section clearly shows that it is very different from a provision such as the plaintiffs contend it is intended to be, merely declaring that a judgment which is conclusive or admissible in evidence against any party may be impeached by such party on the ground of fraud or collusion. If that had been the object of the section the words to a suit or other proceeding “and” and which has been proved by the adverse party” would have been wholly unnecessary.

                  To accept the plaintiffs’ contention would be to hold that these portions of the section are matters of elaborate surplusage intended to serve no purpose and needlessly introduced into the section, notwithstanding that they are calculated to mislead. The section makes the same provision for impeaching on the ground of fraud judgments inter partes, and judgments in rein or judgments relating to public matters. Now it is not disputed, nor can it be disputed (see Taylor on Evidence, 9th edition, Section 1713) that a stranger to a judgments rem or a judgment relating to a public matter against whom such judgment is used in evidence under Section 41 can impeach it on the ground of fraud in the suit in which it is so used. And it is not reasonable to suppose that the same words are used in a different sense when applied to judgments inter partes, that is judgments relevant under Section 40. Let us next examine how far the construction, which the defendant asks us to adopt, does really lead to any anomalous and unreasonable consequences as the plaintiffs contend.  It was contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs that if a party to a suitor proceeding was allowed to show in such suit or proceeding that, a judgment against him was obtained by fraud, it would be open to a judgment debtor in the course of execution proceedings to impeach the decree sought to be executed a result which could never have been intended. The answer to this contention is that Section 44, if its language is carefully considered, cannot lead to any such result. For the judgment or decree, which the section allows a party to impeach on the ground of fraud must, as the section says, be one “which has been proved by the adverse party “a qualification which cannot apply to a decree sought to be executed, a decree not requiring; to be proved in the proceedings taken to enforce it. But then it was argued that, if those words are to have full effect given to them, the section will fail to provide for the setting aside by a separate suit of a judgment or decree on the ground of fraud, when such judgment or decree has not yet been used against the party seeking to set it aside. The answer to this argument is that the right of a party to set aside by a suit a judgment or decree on the ground of fraud, exists independently of the provisions of the Evidence Act.. Then it was contended for the plaintiffs that if Section 44 was construed literally it might allow a party to impeach a judgment on the ground of his own fraud. That, however, is an objection which will hold good equally against the plaintiffs’ construction of the section. For if a party is not to be allowed to impeach a judgment on the ground of his own fraud he ought to be precluded from doing so quite as much when he seeks to establish such fraud in the case in which the judgment is used as evidence, as when he brings a separate suit for the purpose. If a party is precluded from doing so he is precluded, not by any rule of evidence, but by the general principles of justice which prohibit a person to plead his own fraud.

Conclusion

             My conclusion is that fraud is a serious type of offense according to the mode and nature of the offense.  The fraud can be prevented by some of the strict measure by the government. There are a lot that our society has to improve. If the people have a proper awareness about this fraud some of them would not be deceived and the others might not cheat. There must be crime less society only if we have a good awareness.

Bibliography

  1.   P S A Pillai, Criminal Law, Lexis Nexis, (2020) 14th edition.
  2. Criminal Law Bare Act

[1] 1974 AIR 1764, 1975 SCR (1) 57

[2] (1900) ILR 27 Cal 11

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