ASSESSING THE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN INDIA
Abstract
ASSESSING THE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN INDIA
AUTHOR - RISHIT PAUL, STUDENT AT WEST BENGAL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF JURIDICAL SCIENCES
BEST CITATION - RISHIT PAUL, ASSESSING THE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN INDIA, ILE COMPETITION AND COMPANY LAW JOURNAL, 3 (1) OF 2025, PG. 71-79, APIS – 3920-0028 | ISSN - 2583-8385.
Abstract
In India's financial architecture, credit rating agencies (CRAs) play a crucial role by affecting capital allocation, investment choices, and systemic stability. Despite its regulatory significance, market trust is also weakened by enduring worries about conflicts of interest, rating inflation, a lack of accountability, and ineffective enforcement measures. In order to address these structural weaknesses, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Credit Rating Agencies) Regulations, 1999, are examined critically in this article. Using a doctrinal research technique, the study examines the evolving boundaries of regulatory control by analysing the statutory framework governing CRAs as well as significant judicial interventions, such as Brickwork Ratings v. SEBI and Vidarbha Industries v. Axis Bank. Although recent enforcement actions and judicial scrutiny have reinforced supervisory control, the paper contends that there are still important gaps, especially with regard to rating shopping, the issuer-pays model, and the lack of meaningful civil and criminal liability. The study emphasizes the need for improved transparency, proactive monitoring, and more precise accountability requirements by placing India's CRA regime in the larger framework of financial market regulation and post-crisis reform. In order to strengthen regulatory credibility and guarantee that credit ratings fulfil their intended function as trustworthy indicators of credit risk in India's financial markets, it ends by suggesting specific legislative and policy changes.