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ILE-AIT-650 Indian Journal of Legal Review (IJLR)
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<strong>Cyber Warfare’s and International Humanitarian Law</strong>

Author(s): ILE Legal Blog
Volume: 4 Issue: 2 Year: 2023 ISSN: 2583-2344 APIS: 3920-0001 Publisher: Institute of Legal Education (ILE)
Recommended Bluebook Citation
ILE Legal Blog, <strong>Cyber Warfare’s and International Humanitarian Law</strong>, 4 Indian Journal of Legal Review 2 (2023).

Abstract

Cyber Warfare’s and International Humanitarian Law

Author - Anshika Srivastava, Student of Rajiv Gandhi National University Of Law

Introduction

Cyber operations, that occur in or have the resemblance of an armed conflict, are alluded to as "cyber warfare." These cyber operations can be used to infiltrate a computer system in order to gather, extract, decimate, alter, or encrypt data, or to initiate, halt, modify, or otherwise subvert mechanisms operated by the infiltrated system. They entail the creation and transmission of computer code from a source computer to a target computer. Such activities could potentially lead to a significant degree of human suffering, even if they're targeted at computers rather than people. Since civilian and military computer infrastructure are so interconnected and reliant on one another, it can be extremely difficult to differentiate them apart, heightening the danger that civilians and civilian objects would indeed be harmed as a result of cyberwarfare.  As a corollary, it is quite plausible that an attack on a computer system used by the military will also impair computers used by civilians. These in turn may be vital for the transfer of assets or some civil services like the supply of water or electricity.

Adopting Modern Cyber Technology into Old Legislation

The process of adaptation is more onerous in the area of international law. One reason is because a single state's legislature cannot establish an international norm; rather, it can only exist once several governments have agreed to be bound by it. Such consensus is complex to achieve since governments are motivated by many and frequently conflicting interests and incentives. Since pertinent judgement commonly comes up haphazardly in cases from numerous states, it can be difficult to consistently derive a cogent and reliable interpretation, making it difficult to adapt international law through judicial interpretation. IHL governs situations of armed conflict that naturally inspire opposing perspectives between states, making the process of adapting law to change particularly difficult. The core principles of IHL are still maintained in treaties that are many decades old, and in some cases go back more than a century, because governments rarely reach the needed unanimity on such concerns. But while the law changes gradually, the battlefield is changing quickly and new weapons and tactics are always being developed. Thus, closing the gap in time and context between the moment a law is drafted and the moment it is implemented is an issue that is only getting more critical. The IHL standards guiding the waging of combat, including fundamental concepts like the obligation to use precaution and the principles of distinction and proportionality, are extensively and dynamically defined and can thus be adjusted to suit even significant developments. All forms of warfare, including the use of all weapons, are governed by these broad principles, which also apply to cyberwarfare. Their ability to adapt to change is put to the ultimate test in cyber warfare, though. The IHL framework for regulating hostilities was intended to apply to all sorts of hostilities, including those involving the use of kinetic force in the real world. As a by-product, it fits conflicts involving the manipulation of data in cyberspace bizarrely. In addition, when applied to cyber warfare, core IHL terms and distinctions like "armed conflict," "attack," "civilian target," and "military purpose" are difficult to comprehend.

Do the Limitations of Armed Conflict Apply to Cyber Warfare?

It is first imperative to ascertain if the particular cyber operation in question was carried out in the setting of and with a nexus to an armed conflict because IHL only applies in the context of armed confrontation. The application of IHL to cyber operations taking place in the midst of an active armed conflict would seem to be fairly straightforward to demonstrate, but even in that case, it is far from obvious and complicating circumstances are likely to be involved. It might not always be feasible to prove a nexus between the operations and the armed conflict, in particular. Due to the nature of cyber operations, it is conceivable that the identity of the person conducting them out may be unidentified, rendering it significantly plausible that there will be no evidence to back up charges that the actions were carried out by or on behalf of a party to an armed conflict. IHL would not be applicable for as long as the proximity to armed conflict is in debate. The problem would be exacerbated if other forms of conflicts did not coexist with cyberwarfare. In these circumstances, it also becomes uncertain whether cyber operations themselves can constitute conventional warfare. It has been postulated that adopting adequate legal presumptions may serve to some extent to ameliorate this dilemma. So, for instance, until a state could demonstrate differently, it would be deemed to be in control of any cyber operation coming from its governmental infrastructure. However, such a presumption is not addressed in the current international law. The presumption may also seem arbitrary and impose an unfair obligation on states considering the ease at which credentials can be accessed in cyberspace and the challenge of securing database server from tampering.

Cyberwarfare and the IHL Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities

Identifying which cyber attacks would fall under the guidelines for conducting hostilities would be the first issue in this regard. This point is crucial as cyber attacks can substantially hinder the operation of critical infrastructure without causing the amount of physical destruction inflicted by conventional tactics and weapons of war. Then, considering the kinds of cyber operations that do fall under the conduct of hostilities framework, it will be required to consider how the pertinent laws, and most fundamentally, the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, are to be adapted and applied to cyber warfare. It is widely acknowledged that the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I), which codifies the laws of hostilities, reflects customary international law that governs both international and non-international armed conflicts. The majority of the specific guidelines in this framework are designed to place limitations on the military actions that are considered "attacks." This has led many to believe that only cyber activities that qualify as attacks under IHL are subject to the regulations on the conduct of hostilities. This viewpoint is hard to square with the premise that all of the terminology referring to military acts generally are found in the provisions of Additional Protocol I that define the norms of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. If these clauses are not to be regarded as superfluous, then the basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities should be understood to apply to both attacks and hostilities in a broad sense, i.e. to additional military actions borne out during a militarised war with the intent of destroying the adversaries. Attacks are referred to as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence" in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I, which is congruent with conventional IHL. It is acknowledged that violence is related to the effects of the attack, not the methods employed to bring about those effects. Considering this, sending computer code-while not in and of itself a physical act of violence-could yet constitute as an attack if it leads to violence.

Conclusion

Cyber operations are undoubtedly subject to the law, and IHL governs them when they resemble or take place during an armed conflict. There is no doubt that IHL applies to cyber warfare, but many concerns arise when determining how to apply it, which have not received a thorough and sufficient response. Given their secrecy and the fact that they encompass tactics and means of warfare that are so diametrically opposed to those that IHL was created to control, it will frequently be problematic to even ascertain whether cyber warfare occurs within and in connection to an armed conflict. It is not totally apparent which cyber attacks would be covered by these regulations, even when this is determined and their relevance to hostilities is established. Furthermore, it is not clear how this novel form of warfare should be governed by the established laws. IHL must be applied in a way that effectively shields civilians and civilian infrastructure from the destructive effects of cyberwarfare. This is essential from a humanitarian perspective. To maintain the humanitarian ideals, a careful reading of current legislation in light of the overarching humanitarian aim of IHL is needed. It could also be required to enact some further stringent laws.

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